



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

III.— *On the Aorist Subjunctive and Future Indicative with*
Ὅπως and Οὐ μή.

By WILLIAM W. GOODWIN,

ELIOT PROFESSOR OF GREEK LITERATURE IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

The rule was first laid down by Dawes, an English scholar of the last century, (*Miscellanea Critica*, pp. 222, 228,) that ὅπως μή and the double negative οὐ μή can take the future indicative of all voices, but the aorist subjunctive active and middle only in the *second* form. This declares the *first* aorist subjunctive active and middle a solecism after these particles. Later writers have extended the rule to ὅπως (without μή;) and indeed there seems no good reason for restricting such a rule to negative clauses. A large number of examples are given by Dawes and his followers, showing that there was a strong tendency on the part of the Greek writers to observe some such principle as the one above stated. This arises from the fact that the future indicative and most of the prohibited forms of the subjunctive differ only by the quantity of a single vowel; so that, whenever a writer wished to use a subjunctive after a particle which allowed both the future and the subjunctive, he naturally avoided, if possible, an expression which was nearly identical in sound, and (before long and short *E* and *O* were distinguished in writing) generally identical in form with the future. For example, the regular use of ὅπως with the future indicative is found in object clauses after verbs of *striving, effecting, &c.*, where the dependent clause is the real object of the leading verb or in apposition with an accusative like τοῦτο; as σκόπει ὅπως τοῦτο μὴ ποιήσει, *see to it that he does not do this*. Now when a subjunctive was required in a pure final clause, an author would avoid such an expression as ὅπως (or ὅπως μὴ) ποιήσῃ, and would prefer some other final particle (as ἵνα); or he would use some synonymous verb in which the second aorist subjunctive occurs, or perhaps a present subjunctive. This, however, was a mere *tendency*; and it should not be raised to the dignity of a grammatical principle.

The construction just mentioned, that of object clauses with

ὅπως, supplies nearly all the standard examples of ὅπως and the future. Here the subjunctive is allowed only as an exceptional form, apparently as a less vivid form than the future indicative; and it was especially natural here that a writer should choose the second aorist, when he wished to use a subjunctive, rather than a form which was almost identical with the ordinary future. Still, unless we determine to carry out the general principle against the highest manuscript authority, we must admit a few cases of the first aorist subjunctive even here; as in Demosth. Phil. III. p. 128, 25: ὅπως μηδεὶς ἀνατρέψῃ, τοῦτο σκοπεῖσθαι (as all MSS. have it), where modern editions have ἀνατρέψει by emendation. Again, in Demosth. Olynth. I. p. 9, 17: παρασκευάσασθαι τὴν ταχίστην ὅπως ἐνθένδε βοηθήσῃτε καὶ μὴ πάθητε ταυτόν (where modern editions have βοηθήσετε and πάθητε, although all the MSS. except one have βοηθήσητε), there seems to be no good reason for objecting to the first aorist subjunctive, when all admit the other subjunctive πάθητε. The mixture of the two moods is certainly more objectionable than that of the two forms of the aorist, especially when the former is the result of conjectural emendation. Whatever we may think of doubtful cases like the first example, where certainly the authority of usage is decidedly in favor of the future and against the subjunctive, there is no ground for an extension of the principle to a construction in which option between the subjunctive and the future was hardly allowed in Attic Greek. I mean that of pure final clauses, in which the subjunctive is the only good Attic prose construction, the exceptional cases of the future being too few to be considered. But even here the emendation on Dawes's principle has been extended, so that many sentences have been made nearly or quite ungrammatical by unnecessary emendation. Thus in Thuc. VII. 39, ὅπως ἀριστοποιήσωνται καὶ . . . ἐπιχειρώσιν is supported by many of the best MSS.; but the editions have ἀριστοποιήσονται, which is entirely opposed to Attic usage. So in Thuc. II. 60, ξυνήγαγον, ὅπως ὑπομνήσω καὶ μέμψωμαι is very often emended by reading μέμψομαι, a reading which ought not to be accepted without the highest manuscript authority, and then only as a rare exception. Again in Xen. Cyr. VII. 5, 82, ὅπως . . . ἀπολαύσωμεν καὶ ὅπως . . . γενώμεθα is

unobjectionable, although it violates the rule of which we are speaking; if it conformed to that rule it would be irregular, not to say ungrammatical. These cases of the first aorist are rare, for the simple reason given above; but the general statement of the rule, and its application without distinction to both constructions of ὅπως, ignore one of the most important principles of Greek syntax.*

A large number of cases in which the first aorist subjunctive with ὅπως μή has been emended to the future indicative belong to the elliptical construction in prohibitions, where a verb like σκοπεῖτε, *see to it*, is understood (as in ὅπως μή με θύσετε, *see that you do not sacrifice me*, i. e. *do not sacrifice me*, Aristoph. Nub. 257). For example, in ὅπως δὲ τοῦτο μὴ διδάξης μηδένα, *but see that you teach this to nobody*, Nub. 824, the modern editions read διδάξεις against the authority of all the MSS. Now, even if we do not admit the full construction σκόπει ὅπως μὴ διδάξης to be classic, it is a new and (as it seems to me) an unwarranted assumption that, when σκόπει was omitted and the expression became a mere prohibition,—in which, probably, no common Athenian ever thought of σκόπει, or ever knew that he was committing an ellipsis of that verb,—every

* In Soph. Elec. 956, ὅπως μὴ κατοκνήσεις, the emendation made on Dawes's principle, supported by a few late MSS. and now universally accepted, can be justified only on the ground that ἐς σὲ βλέπω in the leading sentence implies an exhortation or entreaty, so that the clause with ὅπως may be considered a sort of object clause. (See Plat. Rep. VIII. p. 549 E: διακελεύονται ὅπως τιμωρήσεται πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους.) Even then the subjunctive would merely belong to the same class with the doubtful instance above quoted from Demosth. Phil. III. If, however, it were a pure final clause, the future could be justified only by the highest manuscript authority, like any other rare exception.

In Plat. Gorg. p. 513 A, ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα has generally been interpreted as a final clause, *that we may not suffer*. It has seemed to me, on the ground above stated, that this must be an object clause depending on ἔρα; and I am glad to be confirmed by the high authority of Dr. Thompson, who, in his admirable commentary on the Gorgias, translates the passage, *see that we do not suffer*, &c. I cannot help venturing to dissent, however, from the same learned scholar, when (in his note on p. 510 A) he approves the common emendation ἀδικήσωμεν as "indispensable" in the passage: καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δόναμιν καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. Here the clause with ὅπως is not the object of παρασκευαστέον, or in apposition with a τοῦτο which is the object of that word; but it explains ἐπὶ τοῦτο, *to this end*, and is therefore a final clause requiring the subjunctive.

one was bound on theory to say ὅπως μὴ διδάξεις rather than ὅπως μὴ διδάξης. In fact, we may perhaps doubt whether the more common form of prohibition, μὴ διδάξης, did not make ὅπως μὴ διδάξης a more natural form here than the other: certainly the analogy will help to justify this form here, when it is supported, as it is in many familiar examples, by the best manuscript authority.

In regard to οὐ μή, the doctrine of Dawes as modified by Elmsley's theory (explained below) has long prevailed; and even scholars who reject both Dawes's Canon and Elmsley's theory, still follow the former in their practice. As to Dawes's rule, what has been said of ὅπως in object clauses holds true of οὐ μή, that two constructions (the future indicative and the subjunctive) being allowed by usage, the form of the aorist subjunctive which was not liable to be mistaken for a future would naturally be chosen, when that tense was to be used at all. But by Elmsley's theory, two entirely distinct constructions with οὐ μή are to be recognized; one in ordinary negative assertions, where all agree that οὐ μή with either the subjunctive or the future indicative (but commonly the subjunctive) is equivalent to a strong future (οὐ μὴ γένηται or οὐ μὴ γενήσεται = οὐ γενήσεται); and another confined to the second person in prohibitions, where only the future indicative is to be tolerated, and where, for example, οὐ μὴ τοῦτο ποιήσεις; is a question, meaning *will you NOT NOT do this?*—i. e. *do not do this*. If this view is accepted, of course it seems very natural that there should have been a distinction in the form allowed in such entirely distinct constructions; and accordingly the rule is stated absolutely, that only the future can be used in the interrogative construction and that *no case of the subjunctive is to be found in it*. Surely enough, if we examine the Greek poets in modern editions, we shall find no example of the subjunctive, but invariably the future indicative, in the prohibitive construction with the second person; although many editors now abandon the interrogative theory, and apparently explain both constructions on the same general principle. A very different result, however, will be obtained if we refer to older editions, or to the manuscripts themselves, as will be

shown below. In the other construction (the mere negative assertion) both moods are found in all our editions, except that the first aorist subjunctive in the proscribed forms is generally changed to the future indicative.

The theory of Elmsley is a mere theory; and it is fast becoming obsolete, except so far as its influence still keeps up a distinction between the two constructions with *οὐ μή*. Its chief support is found in a few sentences in which a command in the form of a question is followed by a prohibition with *μή*, as in Soph. Oed. Tyr. 637: *οὐκ εἶ σύ τ' οἴκους, σύ τε Κρέων κατὰ στέγας, καὶ μὴ τὸ μηδὲν ἄλγος εἰς μέγ' οἴσετε*. If this is to be explained as entirely interrogative, it seems more natural to consider the first part a common question with *οὐ*,—*Will you not go?*—and the last part a question with *μή*, implying a negative answer,—*You will not raise, will you?* As it is more than probable, therefore, that there is no combination of *οὐ* and *μή* at all in these expressions, they are entitled to little weight in the discussion; and there are probably few scholars who would be willing to accept Elmsley's theory for the other clauses without this support. Apart from the exceeding awkwardness of the expression, *Will you not not do this?* for *Do not do this*, Elmsley's theory is open to the fatal objection that it attempts to explain expressions so obviously similar as *οὐ μὴ τοῦτο ποιήσεις* and *οὐ μὴ τοῦτο ποιήσει* on entirely different and opposing principles. If the former means *Will you not not do this?* it is incredible that the latter should mean *He will not do this*, or even *There is no fear that he will do this*. The theory cannot stand for a moment, if it is shown that the subjunctive is as authentic a form in the prohibitive construction as the future, so that no distinction *in form* between the two constructions can be maintained.

The analogy of ordinary prohibitions gives a strong presumption in favor of the aorist subjunctive in the prohibitive construction with *οὐ μή*. What was said above of the elliptical prohibitions introduced by *ὅπως μή* applies with still greater force here. The familiarity of such expressions as *μὴ τοῦτο ποιήσης* or *μὴ ληρήσης* would seem to make *οὐ μὴ τοῦτο ποιήσης* or *οὐ μὴ ληρήσης* a perfectly natural form for expressing the same

idea with greater emphasis. But the question must be tested by an appeal to the only real evidence that we have as to the usage of the Attic writers. It required no new collation of the manuscripts to establish the fact that there is good authority in them for expressions like οὐ μή ληρήσης. But the answer is always ready, that *ει* and *η* are so constantly confused in Greek manuscripts that no argument can be based on the authority of the copyists. I have therefore examined the most important passages of the *Clouds* and *Frogs* of Aristophanes in which οὐ μή occurs, in the two Venetian MSS. of the Library of St. Mark (Nos. 474 and 475),* and in the seven Paris MSS. which contain both comedies (including No. 2712), and also those of the *Clouds* in three other Paris MSS. At the same time, in order to ascertain whether the copyists of these MSS. were careless in writing *ει* and *η*, I examined several passages in the same MSS. containing futures in *-εις* or subjunctives in *-ης*, which (on metrical or grammatical grounds) could not be changed to the other forms. Passages of this last class are Nub. 1352, πάντως δὲ τοῦτο ἐράσεις (where no MS. has ἐράσης); 1035, εἰ ὀφλήσεις (where one MS. has *-ης*); 1479, μηδὲ μ' ἐπιτρέψης (all the MSS.). So we find κατερεῖς and οἴσεις, Ran. 298, 524, without variation; although in 298 most, if not all, MSS. have οὐ μή καλῆς (which is evidently intended for a present subjunctive, and might perhaps be allowed on the authority of οὐ μή δύνηται, οὐ μή οἶός τ' ᾔης, &c.). Ἀκολουθήσεις in Nub. 505 is instructive here; for although one Venetian and six Paris MSS. have λαλήσης (or *-ης*), only three very poor Paris MSS. have ἀκολουθήσης (one of these has *-σης* by correction from *-σεις*). This shows that there was something in the future in the second case which prevented copyists from writing it with final *-ης* or *-ης*, even after they had just written λαλήσης or λαλήσης (see below). I give these

* The MS. designated Ven. 475 is the elegant folio said to have been copied from the older Venetian MS. 474 in the fifteenth century. As it often differs from the older MS., even in the few lines here quoted, I have thought its readings worth noting. The readings of a late MS. are valuable as far as they show the care of the copyist in copying certain forms (as *-εις* and *-ης*) or indicate the readings of the older MS. which he copied. Among the MSS. here included, only Ven. 474 and Par. 2712 are old enough to be of *independent* authority for the text.

results merely to show that, whatever may be the authority *on other grounds* against οὐ μή and the aorist subjunctive in prohibitions, and however we may choose to despise the copyists who have transmitted this form to us, it cannot be said that *these particular copyists* of the MSS. of Aristophanes were so careless of the distinction between -ης and -εις as to write one for the other indiscriminately.

I give the readings of the above mentioned MSS. in Nub. 296, 367, 505, 824, and Ran. 524 retaining the peculiarities of the copyists in writing οὐ μή and μηδέ in the first and third passages:

I. Nub. 296, 297. Οὐ μή σκώψης· μηδὲ ποιήσης ἅπερ οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες οὗτοι· ἀλλ' εὐφήμει. Ven. 474, Par. 2712. — Οὐ μή σκώψης· οὐδὲ ποιήσης, &c. Ven. 475. — Οὐ μή σκώψης μη δὲ ποιήσης, &c. Par. 2821, 2824, 2902. — Οὐ μή σκώψης μη δὲ ποιήσης, &c. Par. 2822. — Οὐ μή σκώψης· μη δὲ ποιήσης, &c. Par. 2598, 2716, 2820. — Οὐ· μή σκώψης· μή δὲ ποιήσης, &c. Par. 2823 (with schol. ὅρα ἵνα ὑβρίσης). — Οὐ· μή σκώψης· μη δὲ ποιήσης, &c. Par. 2717. — Par. 2716 has φλυαρήσης over σκώψης.

II. Nub. 367. Οὐ· μη ληρήσης. Ven. 474, Par. 2823 (-ης). 2824. — Οὐ μη ληρήσης. Ven. 475, Par. 2712. — All others have οὐ μη (οὐ μη, or οὐ μη) ληρήσης, except Par. 2821, which has οὐ μη ληρήσεις (with ὅρ' ἵνα over οὐ), and Par. 2822, which has οὐ μη ληρῆς.

III. Nub. 505. Οὐ· μη λαλήσεις· ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί. Ven. 474. Same, with οὐ μη, Par. 2716, 2824. Οὐ μη λαλήσεις· ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί. Ven. 475, Par. 2712, 2821, 2902. Οὐ μη λαλήσεις· ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί. Par. 2717, 2823; also, Par. 2598 has -σης by correction from -σεις. Par. 2820 has οὐ μη λαλήσοις· ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσοις ἐμοί, (with -σον written over -σοις in both verbs.) Par. 2822 has σὺ (corr. to οὐ) μη, λαλήσεις. ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί.

IV. In Nub. 824, all manuscripts have ὅπως δὲ τοῦτο μη διδάξης μηδένα, except that Par. 2823 has διδάξης. Par. 2716 omits the verse, and has in the margin ὅρα ὅπως δὲ του μη δείξης μηδένα.

V. Ran. 524, 525. Οὐ μη φλυαρήσης ἔχων . . . ἀλλ' ἀράμενος οἷσεις πάλιν τὰ στρώματα. Ven. 474, 475; Par. 2712, 2716, 2821, 2820 (with -σον over -σεις). Par. 2717, 2822, 2824 have φλυαρήσεις and οἷσεις.

According to the best authorities accessible in this country, the Ravenna MS. has the aorist subjunctive in Nub. 296* (in both verbs), 367, and 824; in 505 it has *λαλήσης* corrected to *-σεις*, and *ἀκολουθήσεις*. I can find no trustworthy statement of its reading in Ran. 524.

It will be seen that, although there is excellent manuscript authority for the future indicative in some examples, especially those in which this tense follows in a second clause (as in Nub. 505), there is also the very best authority in other cases for the subjunctive. The strongest case, and indeed the case which makes the real nature of these examples clearer than any other, is that of Nub. 296, 297. Here we have the unanimous authority of the MSS. for *σκώψης* and *ποιήσης*. Now there is no future *σκώψω* known in classic Greek; and the change to *σκώψει*, which was made by Elmsley and is generally adopted in modern editions, is certainly a bold emendation to make in support of a mere theory, and a still bolder one to maintain after that theory is abandoned. This passage alone is sufficient to show that Elmsley's theory is unsound, and it refuses to conform to the required punctuation. In Nub. 505, for example, the interrogation-mark (on Elmsley's theory) would follow *ἀκολουθήσεις* *ἐμοί*. But where can it be placed here? Surely not after *ἀλλ' ἐνφίμει*: and if it is to precede this, why should it not precede *ἀλλ' ἀκολουθήσεις* in v. 505? The use of the imperative here in the second clause shows plainly that the preceding words are a mere prohibition and not interrogative. And if such expressions are mere prohibitions, it is much simpler and more satisfactory to explain this and the more common construction of *οὐ μή* on the same principle. I cannot pretend to account for the doubling of the negative in either construction of *οὐ μή*, any more than in that of *μή οὐ* with the infinitive and participle. The common explanation, that there is an ellipsis of a word like *φόβος* or *δεινόν*, is unsatisfactory, especially in explaining the future indicative with *οὐ μή*. The future is a well established con-

* While this paper has been printing, I have learned from a distinguished English scholar, who has collated the Ravenna MS. of Aristophanes, that this MS. reads *οὐ μή σκώψης* in Nub. 296.

struction in the first and third persons with *οὐ μή*, and yet it is a very rare form with *μή* after expressions of *fear* or *danger*. Whatever may have been its origin, I cannot doubt that in an expression like *οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ἡμῖν οὐ μή γένηται τῶν δεόντων* (Dem. Phil. I. p. 53, 4) the speaker merely used the strongest negative which the language afforded for what would commonly be expressed by *οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ἡμῖν γενήσεται*. To supply a verb of *fearing* here would be clearly absurd. The second person is often used in this way, as in *ἀλλ' οὐ ποτ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γε μή πάθῃς τόδε* (Soph. Elect. 1029), where the position of *ποτ'* shows that *οὐ* belongs to *πάθῃς* quite as much as *μή* does. In these cases the subjunctive seems to be a relic of the common Homeric subjunctive, which is nearly or quite equivalent to a simple future, as in *οὐ τοίους ἴδον οὐδέ ἴδωμαι*. The use of the future indicative in prohibitions is amply justified by its use in imprecations, as *ἀπολεῖσθε, οἰμώξεσθε*, and still more by examples like *πάντως δὲ τοῦτο δρᾷσεις* (Nub. 1352), *but by all means do this*, where the future has nearly the force of an imperative. The same use of the future is seen in *ἀκολουθήσεις* (Nub. 505) and *οἴσεις* (Ran. 525), quoted above, which express mere command. *Οὐ μὴ εὔρῃ τοῦτο*, therefore, means simply *he will not find this*; *οὐ μὴ εὔρῃς* means *you will not find*; so *οὐ μὴ ποιήσεις τοῦτο* or *οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃς τοῦτο* means *you will not (or shall not) do this*, which may be a prohibition equivalent to *do not do this*.

In Soph. Phil. 381 we find *καὶ ταῦτα . . . οὐ μή ποτ' ἐς τὴν Σκῦρον ἐκπλεύσῃς ἔχων*. Here we could not read *ἐκπλεύσεις*, as there is no such future; nor even *ἐκπλεύσει*, as the metre forbids. The meaning clearly is *you shall not sail away*, &c., and yet the clause cannot be made interrogative. Is not this passage a striking illustration of the inseparable unity of the so called "two constructions" with *οὐ μή*, and does it not, with the aid of the imperative in Aristoph. Nub. 297, clearly show that both subjunctive and future are simply *emphatic futures* in meaning, which may in the second person — like all futures — have the force of commands?

In conclusion, I would maintain as the result of this investigation, that *οὐ μή* can take either the subjunctive (commonly

the aorist) or the future indicative in every person, and that the common exclusion of the subjunctive of the second person in prohibitions is not authorized by the Greek manuscripts, or by any known principle of the language. As to *ὅπως*, the construction always determines whether it regularly takes the future indicative or the subjunctive; and whatever view we may take of exceptional subjunctives in object clauses, no arbitrary rule can ever justify a future indicative in a pure final clause, in Attic Greek, against manuscript authority.

IV.—*On the best Method of Studying the North American Languages.*

BY J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL,
OF HARTFORD, CONN.

THE collection of materials for the study of American aboriginal languages is already large. Indian vocabularies, grammars and grammatical notices may be reckoned by hundreds, and every year adds to their number. Among these are to be found many works of permanent value, indispensable to students of the languages of which they treat, a few of distinguished excellence, widely known and highly appreciated as contributions to comparative philology, and many others which, without imparting thorough or exact grammatical or lexical knowledge, have been very useful to explorers, missionaries and others, by facilitating communications with savage tribes. But if we look carefully through the entire collection (excluding, however, from present consideration all additions which have been made to it in the last ten years) we shall be obliged to confess—not without some mortification to the pride of American scholarship—that a great part of it is absolutely worthless to critical students of language, and what is worse, that the real value of original materials has in many instances been lost or much depreciated by the method of their exhibition. We shall find many rash gener-